After The War and After The Wall:British Perceptions of Germany Following 1945 and 1989 by Michail, Evgenios Panagiotis
Evgenios Michail  
After The War and After The Wall: British Perceptions of Germany Following 1945 and 1989  
University of Sussex Journal of Contemporary History, 3 (2001) 
After The War and After The Wall:  
British Perceptions of Germany Following 1945 and 1989  
 
Evgenios Michail 
 
 
British reactions to the prospect of German Unification in 1989 and to that of an even 
stronger Germany revealed that at least part of the British public still perceived Germany 
through notions and stereotypes based on the wartime experience. At the end of the 20th 
century, while Germany and the whole world were opening new chapters in history, Britain 
seemed more resistant to change than generally would be expected. By focusing on British 
attitudes towards Germany after 1945, and after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, this paper 
provides a brief history of the British perception of Germany from the end of World War II. 
The aim of the paper is twofold: to identify the origins of negative images of Germany in 
Britain; and furthermore, to examine the legitimacy of the widely accepted view that Britain 
has adopted a lasting negative attitude towards Germany. 
 
The German Abnormality 
In the spring of 1945, the revelations of the details surrounding the Holocaust and the 
atrocities perpetrated in the concentration camps came as a shock to the international 
community. By then, two generations of British people had witnessed the aggressive policies 
of Wilhelmian and Hitlerite Germany. For them, the memories of the two World Wars were 
too vivid to be forgotten; seen alongside the cruel Nazi crimes they also seemed inexplicable. 
The only plausible answer, to this traumatic experience, lay in the belief that there was a 
special element in the German psyche that drove Germans almost without will to these 
catastrophic actions. It is in this context that the concept of a German abnormality gained 
momentum, burdening with its stigma the country’s image for the years to follow.  
Some looked to find the origins of this abnormality in the very character of the German 
people. "Those Germans, they’re just not human", declared a sixty-year-old Englishwoman, 
who was certainly not alone in her beliefs.1 "The Germans have a sadistic trait in them, and 
delight in the sufferings of other races" pronounced one Londoner.2 Stephen Spender, 
visiting Germany in 1945, agreed with other critics in that there was: 
 
a special kind of German suggestibility – willingness to obey orders, thinking in 
generalisations, the search for panaceas, faith in power, which made many Germans 
capable of falling to deeper depths than many people of other nations.3 
  
The "otherness" of German qualities was frequently stated in a way that re-affirmed 
the superior nature of the British through binary opposites: normality versus perversion, 
goodness versus evil, civilisation versus barbarism and so on.4 This form of discourse was 
based on theories of racial characteristics which were relatively popular in the first half of the 
20th century, and especially so amongst the Nazis. However, no one at that time would accept 
any kind of correlation of this kind. 
But for those who wished to understand the reasons underlying Germany’s troubled 
history, and who were not convinced by such unscientific generalisations, the old Sonderweg 
theory provided a helpful theoretical framework. The idea of a German Sonderweg 
(alternative way) was originally coined by German academics in the 19th century in order to 
explain Germany’s unique vitality and its promising development.5 All that was now 
required was for the theory to be reversed in order to provide a seemingly reasonable 
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explanation for Germany’s misconduct. All features of German history and culture were seen 
again through this idea of the alternative, German way. The distinguished historian AJP 
Taylor blamed Martin Luther for causing disunity amongst the various German states, for 
reaffirming "the German nationalist sense of being different", and for persuading the people 
that it was their Christian duty to obey the orders of their rulers.  
Nationalism and militarism were easily redefined from being features of the Nazi 
régime to those of Germany in general. As Roy Pascal wrote in 1946: 
 
In the case of Germany it was only too inviting, in the period of the Weimar Republic, 
to see German history as the development of democracy; and today, after 
authoritarian leaders have once again led an enthusiastic people in a war of 
expansion, German history may seem to be the history of aggressive nationalism.6  
  
Nationalism was blamed for being the ideological power behind the extreme 
manifestations of German aggression in the previous decades. It was seen as a widespread 
cultural phenomenon, supported in various ways by the most diverse German intellectual 
figures, first of all by Martin Luther himself!7 It was common at that time to compare the 
rational western "Civilization" to the mystical German "Kultur", and to refer to Wagner or 
Nietzsche as being as equally responsible as Hitler, for the rise and the excesses of German 
nationalism.8 Germany’s traditional image as a warrior nation was also quickly recalled. The 
wars between Romans and Germans, the Thirty Years War, the Franco-Prussian conflict in 
1870-1871 were all frequently cited and often simultaneously. The First World War image of 
Prussian militarism (the central role of the army in the running of most state affairs) was also 
recalled. This having already been elaborated and accepted as a fact by the older generations. 
"Prussia, not Germany, is the real, perhaps the implacable, enemy", was an argument 
commonly heard during the war years.9 
Germany’s special geographical position was another reason often cited in order to 
explain German aggression. This was the same argument behind the Lebensraum (vital 
space) theory, on which the Nazis based their aggressive policies towards their neighbours. 
Germany lies at the centre of the European continent and has a large population second only 
to that of Russia. The east and the west had always appealed to the German states as 
alternative routes to survival. This idea of turning Germany’s geographical characteristics 
into a determining reason for its eternal, aggressive quest for expansion is an explanation that 
leaves little space for optimism for the future. If that theory is true, then the Germans are 
bound to strive for expansion eastwards for ever, or until the geographical features of the 
region change dramatically, which is a very distant prospect. However, the country’s postwar 
multiple partition soon made this line of thought quite irrelevant. 
The answer that appeared most convincing to both intellectuals and statesmen of the 
period, and with which the Sonderweg idea became most closely identified, rested upon the 
view that Germany had lagged behind in the development of its political institutions and 
culture. The leading role of the western democracies in defeating Nazism in 1945 had 
reconfirmed their belief of the superiority of their form of political system. In Britain, a 
nation which regarded itself as home to capitalist, modern parliamentary democracy, the 
answer to the question of German "abnormality" was obvious. Germany had proven to be 
incapable of modernising itself according to the Western paradigm; a belief that one 
prominent German, Max Weber, had already accepted at the beginning of the century.10 The 
dramatic, short history of the Weimar republic was often cited as the clearest example of this 
German deficiency. 
Despite the extreme opinions frequently expressed vis-à-vis Germany at this time, in 
comparison with the rest of the Allies, the British adopted a position which some regarded as 
indicative of a kind of moral superiority.11 In 1945, the Institute of Sociology published a 
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book on "The German Mind and Outlook", in which various scientists attempted to 
distinguish "the myths, the types and the propaganda" in their perception of the German 
people.12 It asked the public not to subscribe to oversimplification despite the conflict and, in 
accordance to the popular discourse of racial characteristics, it stressed that the Germans 
were a "gifted, efficient, hard-working, disciplined, romantic, unstable, inflammable and 
formidable nation".13 "The older ones are much like ourselves; the young ones have been 
brought up to this idea of complete domination", said one British female to a Mass 
Observation interviewer, seemingly trying to rationalise the perplexed feelings emanating 
from the war experience.14 When the Nazi crimes of the concentration camps were revealed, 
one reader of the The Manchester Guardian wrote: 
 
When the war is over and the time for action comes I pray that those who lead the 
world into peace may look for, find and make use of those good Germans in 
Germany. They do exist.15  
 
 
New Qualities for the German People 
As the war drew to a close, the allies faced the future with as much agony as they 
faced the past. Of priority was the reconstruction of Europe together with the maintenance of 
peace and stability. Germany lay at the heart of the problem since its administration and 
future status was now under the responsibility of the Allies. If Germany remained 
destabilised for too long, it would be as equally impossible for the surrounding central 
European countries to feel safe and prosper. Such an outcome would seriously undermine the 
recently and so painfully gained peace, as was noted by The Manchester Guardian in April 
1945: 
 
It is in no sense out of softness towards the Germans that their self-disrupted lives 
must now be organised by the Allies. This task of Military Government is vital in 
hastening the end of the war and vital in creating the practical fabric of peace16  
 
Despite the practical reasons for German reconstruction, some people in Britain as 
well as elsewhere were not ready to accept such a rapid rehabilitation. One could only too 
often hear voices calling for Germany’s de-industrialisation and transformation into an 
agricultural state or for the permanent division of Germany into many small states. Of those 
British asked "what should be done to Germany after the war?" only 7% opted for a 
"constructive" settlement; 28% were for "revengeful" solution and 44 for a "preventative" 
one.17 
However, in the aftermath of its total defeat Germany appeared desolated in "misery, 
disease and starvation".18 Reports on the devastating conditions in the territories of the 
defeated Reich quickly reached the British press. This offered the outside world an 
alternative image to counterbalance the one that represented Germans as evil and abnormal. 
The images of misery and desolation emanating from Germany gradually softened the 
attitude of the British public, which saw itself as morally superior to the vengeful Germans; 
somewhat illustrated by a comment made by a member of the public in February 1948: 
 
I have a complex about the Germans; pity for their misery […] pleasure when I think 
what they brought to the rest of Europe. But the Germans will always hate us.19 
 
By the summer of 1947, almost half of those asked, had no ill feeling towards the 
Germans.20 The Germans were merely regarded as the "spoiled children in need of a strong 
leader" which the British intended to provide.21 This was "Zero Hour" for Germany and the 
beginning of the re-education program. As one of the leading nations, Britain had a moral 
obligation to insure the future development of countries around the world. And if Germany 
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was going to be powerful again, then it would be because Britain had decided and allowed it 
to become so.  
If the first half of the 20th century had been consumed in dealing with the "German 
Problem", the second half of it was dominated by the "Communist Threat". With the advent 
of the Cold War Germany once again became the battlefield albeit in an imagined sense. 
Berlin was situated at the centre of some of the most important incidents of this 
confrontation. Berlin’s blockade in 1948, the East Berlin uprising in 1953, and finally, the 
construction of the Berlin Wall in 1961 were followed with interest by Britain and the 
international community in general at the time and during the years which followed. The 
representation of Germany in other countries suddenly acquired another aspect. In addition to 
the ambivalent view of Germans as the barbaric troublemakers of Europe, and/or the human 
wrecks of a great catastrophe, they were now also reported to be "the innocent victims of 
rivalry among their conquerors".22 The Soviet Union, one of the biggest victims of Nazi 
Germany, became the new threat and everything had to be done to combat this new menace; 
Germany was now an ally.  
 
Two years ago it was still just possible to think of a third German aggression as the 
most likely future source of trouble. Today Germany is a menace only on one 
condition – that it becomes drawn into the Russian orbit and its millions pass under 
Communist Control", wrote The Economist at the beginning of 1949.23  
 
Germany needed to be urgently reconstructed as a bulwark to the Soviet threat.24 The 
prevailing view concerning the errors of Germany’s past was given credence and used as the 
basis for plans regarding the country’s future. If the problem consisted of Germany’s 
incomplete knowledge of democracy, liberalism and capitalism, the allies believed that the 
solution involved the education of the German people in this respect. They would do what 
the German bourgeoisie should have done some time ago. The answer to the problem of 
Germany’s past provided the key to its future. Germany would "be drawn, closely and at last 
contentedly, into the western orbit".25 It was only in the early 1980s that the validity of this 
system of assumptions associated with the Sonderweg theory was questioned for the first 
time by the British historians David Blackbourn and Geoff Eley, and thereafter gradually 
abandoned.26 Nonetheless, Germany, or at least its Western part, did finally follow the 
western paradigm and soon proved to more successful than its educators in this respect. With 
the support of the western allies, Germany recovered astonishingly quickly, rapidly giving 
rise to speculation about the "German economic miracle". 
In contrast to what had happened after the end of World War I, the German people 
now seemed to have "swung from one extreme – of political fanaticism and violence – into 
passivity and apathy".27 Even AJP Taylor, who had so passionately argued in the aftermath 
of World War II on the German abnormality, noted in 1955 that "perhaps the days of German 
greatness have vanished for good. An independent Germany […] may find herself much on 
the level of any other country".28 Germany’s conformity to the main guidelines of the allies 
seemed to be satisfactory enough.29 It was so persistent in resisting participation in the 
NATO alliance that The Manchester Guardian expressed its doubts that Bonn would ever be 
capable of recruiting the necessary men for the new German army.30 The view that Germans 
had actually changed, that they had abandoned excessiveness, and had discovered efficiency, 
was gradually gaining currency. Under the urging necessities of Cold War, the Nazi past fell 
progressively into a form of oblivion, and the "de-nazification" process of German society 
and its political establishment was soon abandoned by the British and their Allies. 
Germany’s new achievements were received as a positive development by parts of the 
British establishment and general public. Principally, for the fact that the ordeal for the 
German people was over. Many certainly took pride in Germany’s success, since it was seen 
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as the best proof of Britain’s magnanimity, and as a result of the successful British 
administration and guidance during the first years following the war. "When I recall my 
feelings, as a soldier with the liberating army, entering and surveying Belsen concentration 
camp, I am amazed by, and rejoice in, the charity shown to the German people by the 
Western Allies after the war" declared a reader of The Economist in 1954.31 Furthermore, a 
strong Germany was considered as an important bulwark against any plans of Moscow for a 
westward expansion. West Germany’s prosperity was seen as a clear manifestation of liberal 
democracy’s superiority over communism.  
Still, Germany’s progress was not all good news for Britain. While the former was 
improving year by year its financial and political status, the latter was showing a worrying 
inability to recover from its wartime exhaustion. In 1958 Germany took Britain’s place as the 
world’s second largest exporter. In the same time the Suez crisis, decolonization and the 
various internal socio-economic problems of the country signalled the rapid decline of 
Britain from the status of an international superpower. And as the years passed the situation 
seemed to be getting even worse. "Today we are not only no longer a world power, but we 
are not in the first rank even as a European one" stated a British ambassador in the late 
1970s.32 United States had long now taken the role of the guardian of Western-capitalist 
world that Great Britain had before World War II. The shift in Britain’s international status 
became ever so clear in the adventure of its application for membership to the European 
Economic Community. Britain’s application was turned down twice by de Gaulle, in 1963 
and 1967, before it became a member in 1973 alongside Ireland and Denmark. In 1973, 
Britain faced Germany once again, but at the political level, and as a partner in the circles of 
the EEC. However, being a founding member of the Community, and with a more powerful 
economy than that of Britain, Germany was actually in the stronger position. 
Admitting Germany’s development was too much for all those who found it difficult 
to accept the parallel decline of Britain’s power. Hence many either denied the extent of the 
German success or attributed it mainly to the help that the Allies offered to the country after 
the war. "Those of us who have had some contact with the German people recognise their 
great qualities and their capacity for hard work. At the same time it appears that German 
powers of self-deception are almost limitless; […] The credit that Dr Erhard himself takes for 
the great success of the export programme leads him to deny the enormous effort made on 
behalf of Western Germany by the three Western Allies."33 
At the same time, Bonn was itself interested in stressing to the international 
community that its prowess should not be overestimated. Highly conscious of the fears and 
the suspicion that its renewed strength would provoke all around Europe, Bonn was very 
careful that its new image would not evoke any memories of the past. In 1952 The Economist 
was already reporting that "the Germans belittle their strength" by campaigning to prove that 
their prosperity was not so great as it seemed.34 The amazing achievement of its economic 
recovery soon resulted in the identification of Germany with totally new qualities. The 
economic miracle of the 1950s seemed to be the culmination of economic and technical 
development that had started in the second half of the 19th century.35 Public opinion, in post-
war Western Europe, soon accepted the idea that the "West Germans abandoned 
excessiveness and discovered efficiency", despite the country’s unimpressive records in most 
other aspects of its public life.36 
Germany was now regarded as a true democracy, and as one of the least militaristic 
countries in the world. Even the images of the methodical and hard working German were 
partially obscured.  
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Hard work was a mania in the early fifties but the Germans – I am pleased to report 
– do not work harder than the British and that’s quite something", mentioned a 
publication of the German embassy in 1973.37 
 
Most of all, however, Germany was interested in placing aside any bitter encounters 
with its recent past. Ever since the war, Germany had experienced an "agonising concern 
about its national identity", which led to a delicate "forging the nation" debate.38 Referred to 
by Mary Fulbrook in 1989 as a state of "collective amnesia",39 this strategy was surprisingly 
adopted by the rest of the world as well. Germany was an advancing, but peaceful power, 
playing a key role, and especially so in the European affairs. The rest of Europe refrained 
from discussing Germany’s past, if not in order to help the country to build a new and 
healthy identity, then so as to ensure that the flow German capital remained uncomprimised. 
"Don’t mention the war", as John Cleese remarks immediately before welcoming a group of 
German tourists to his hotel in the comedy series "Fawlty Towers" in 1975.40 
 
United Germany 
The partition of Germany formed a constant reminder of the division of Europe into 
two opposing camps. Consequently, there was genuine euphoria to news of the fall of the 
Berlin Wall in 1989, and described by one British person as "one of the most joyful events 
ever witnessed by the world".41 Germany’s image gained an attribute that had been lacking 
ever since the war, that of being the centre in which some of Europe’s most memorable 
political developments were taking place.42 But soon Bonn’s plans for German Unification, 
which it realised in 1990, focused attention upon a new and vigorous Germany, determined, 
if anything else, to decide its own future. A new era beckoned with the Germany appearing 
as the most dominant West-European nation. As news of German Unification reached Britain 
and the rest of the world, the memory of Germany’s past still appeared to be the determining 
factor in public attitude.  
 
"It seems that we will have to start our German history lessons all over again, 
rehearsing the arguments that were commonplace among previous generations", 
noted Richard Gott.43  
 
Many arguments of the Sonderweg theory re-appeared.  
 
"Those who believe in enduring national characteristics will always fear some 
confluence of events luring Germany towards a new extremism from which it will be 
incapable of retreating", warned The Economist44. 
 
The country’s geographical position came to the fore of public attention as soon as 
news of the alleged problems at the Polish borderline arrived in Britain. "The Germans are 
trapped by history and geography […] in the centre of Europe and, when united, will have a 
weight hard to balance".45 Neo-Nazi murderous attacks against Gastarbeiter (foreign 
workers) and asylum-seekers also led many people to talk of a revived wave of German 
nationalism. The return of the Prussian element as a determining factor in German political 
and cultural life was seen as especially worrying. Ahead of plans to move the German capital 
from Bonn to Berlin The Economist wondered whether this would signify "a Germany 
thrown back on Prussian ways".46 There was widespread fear that unified Germany would 
stress the great potentialities of the German nation, and at the same time, would try to revise 
the infamous moments of its history. "The rewriting of modern German history is now taking 
place in daily life, not only in academia" The Guardian was warning.47 
Prominent British politicians openly expressed their dislike of a united Germany. 
Margaret Thatcher was the only head of a European country to candidly assert her 
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disagreement to Helmut Kohl’s plans, giving the impression of being, in her own words, "an 
unreconstructed Germano-phobe to boot".48 In July 1990, in an interview to the Spectator, 
the Trade and Industry Secretary Nicholas Ridley spoke passionately against Germany’s 
hegemony in the EEC and the control it practised over the European economy. He criticised 
the French as being the "poodles" of the Germans, and declared that the British would not let 
themselves be bossed around by the Germans.49 Some days later, The Independent published 
secret minutes of a meeting at Chequers in March 1990, between the Prime Minister and 
distinguished British and American historians, and which discussed the new developments 
taking place in Germany. The greatest interest and criticism of the leaked memo concerned a 
list of certain historical characteristics of the German people. These were listed in 
alphabetical order: "Angst, aggressiveness, assertiveness, bullying, egotism, inferiority 
complex, sentimentality".50  
There was a common feeling that Germany had just realised its old plans for 
European domination, against which Britain had fought two world wars. It did not take much 
for those who were negatively disposed towards Germany to rediscover the Reich in the 
modified form of the EEC. A united Germany financially, culturally and politically 
controlled its neighbours and played a dominant role in the EEC, through which it even 
influenced Britain’s internal affairs. In 1997, the Oxford historian Niall Ferguson noted that 
Germany’s plan in World War I was to create "a version of the European Union, eight 
decades ahead of schedule". The fact that it had finally succeeded in its aim led him to 
conclude that Britain should have in the first place accepted a "German victory on the 
continent", avoiding in that way "the massive contraction in British overseas power entailed 
by the fighting of two world wars".51 Ferguson actually referred to a way of re-examining the 
past which had been relatively common amongst the British public since Unification. He 
viewed British and German history of the last hundred years in a comparative way, and felt 
that despite all odds, at the end of the century Germany was finally in the exact position 
which Britain had occupied a hundred years earlier. 
Of course, it was not only Britain that reluctantly accepted the new unified Germany. 
Margaret Thatcher claimed that the French and Soviet Presidents, François Mitterrand and 
Mikhail Gorbachev, shared her views. Moreover, she contended that although they 
traditionally "made statements supporting Germany’s aspiration to be reunited, in practice we 
were rather apprehensive".52 Even from within Germany, there were many voices warning of 
the dangers of a united Germany, with that of Günter Grass being the most prominent. The 
Guardian cited from his latest book in 1990. 
 
The way in which the Chancellor has exercised his power seems to echo Bismarck - 
as if the Prussian aristocracy's politics of steel and blood had actually benefited the 
Germans and their neighbours.53  
 
All these reactions were covered extensively by the British press. In particular, 
French fears of a unified Germany were quite often reported. This suggests that the British 
press may have been attempting to pass the blame of Germanophobia onto its French 
counterparts, especially given the volatile history of Franco-German relations. As Gordon 
Craig wrote suggestively in 1982,  
 
the French, in particular, have been adamant in their conviction that the Germans 
never change and their intermittent suspicion that a reversion to the bad old past 
[…] is not only possible but likely.54 
 
In the meantime, however, the cautious attitude of Germany encouraged the rest of 
Europe to begin its co-existence with a united Germany without substantial fear. In 1996, it 
was a French sports daily L’ Equipe which commented that the British press coverage of the 
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England-Germany match made one feel "as if Germany had never made peace with the 
Allies. It was almost as if they once again bombed London with their V1s".55 The British 
were gradually acquiring an image of a nation that refused most passionately and 
unreasonably to regard the Germans in a modern, flexible and forgiving way. In 1990, The 
Guardian reported: 
 
Mrs Thatcher's initial attempt to thwart unification rankles more in Germany than 
President Mitterrand's opportunistic overtures to the old regime in East Germany, or 
Andreotti's frequently quoted speech about the dangers of pan-Germanism.56 
 
Bonn has launched a PR blitz on London", reported The Observer in 1996, and 
further added that: 
 
Bonn has instructed its diplomats and press officers to convince the British media 
that Germans are not, to pick some recent insults, greedy, hypocritical jack-booted 
thugs bent on creating a Fourth Reich in Europe.57 
 
Germany’s image in Britain remained as unappealing as ever. 
It should be acknowledged that the press stressed the anti-German reactions because 
they made sensational news. Evidently, this does not imply that all of the British public 
shared these opinions. "Hitler, Klinsman, Mataus. Don't know any other footballers", was the 
answer of a pupil in a survey which revealed that Hitler was the best known German figure 
amongst British schoolchildren.58 Substantial parts of British public opinion and the 
establishment, such as the Foreign Office, already acknowledged and even supported the 
inevitable merging of the two Germanies.59 This was partly due to sheer pragmatism. "Britain 
must accept a united Germany as an equal or sink its sovereignty in an integrated continent", 
noted The Guardian.60 The alternative, modern image that Bonn had advocated for all the 
previous decades was gaining ground, supported by the facts themselves. "Berlin; a city 
shadowed by a tragic past but clearly set for a bright future", ran the caption of a holiday 
brochure, advertising in 1992 holiday trips to the new German capital.61 According to an 
opinion poll in January 1990, those British opposed to the Unification of Germany comprised 
only thirty percent of people questioned. Nevertheless, even in this case their number was 
double that of their French counterparts.62 
 
German Sonderweg or An Alternative Way for the British? 
It has often been contended that the negative image of Germany in Britain is most 
likely to be reproduced by people having lived through the war.63 Interestingly, a Mass 
Observation’s survey in 1990 revealed that all but two of those who expressed any 
reservations ahead of German Unification were born in the inter-war years, their average age 
being sixty-three.64 Understandably enough, the older generations are more likely to try to 
judge the future according to their experiences of the past. But the roots of the problem are 
not simply confined to certain historical connotations which naturally influence the views of 
the older sections of the population. The mechanisms of collective memory seemed much 
more persistent than would be expected. The public, especially in the years after the war, 
formulated its views through the new mass media culture. And that, alongside the plethora of 
personal experiences of those who lived through the war made sure that images of Hitler and 
Nazism were kept very much alive in public discourse. Films, fiction books and even 
children’s games recalled only too often the hated icon of the German soldier.65 "It was one 
of Rocky’s films. He was playing and the Germans got him and they kept on getting their 
knives and kept on shaving him" said a nine-year-old boy when asked to mention the sources 
of the negative opinion he had of the Germans.66  
 Evgenios Michail  
After The War and After The Wall: British Perceptions of Germany Following 1945 and 1989  
University of Sussex Journal of Contemporary History, 3 (2001) 
9
Hitler remains the most known German not only among the old war veterans but also 
among their grandchildren. In 1996 the Goethe Institut in London carried out a survey among 
British pupil between the ages of 14 and 16 asking them who were their ten most well known 
Germans, living or dead. Adolf Hitler was by far at the top of the list, which also contained 
the names of Joseph Goebbels and Heinrich Goering.67 A survey of British schoolchildren in 
1995 found that "when it came to desirable foreign destinations, Germany was bottom of the 
list. They would rather go to Bosnia".68 The Germano-phobic discourse of the British public 
consists of a plethora of images, notions and stereotypes, transmitted in all levels of the 
society through a variety of media. "Last week, a report by Professor Pere Salva of the 
University of the Balearics officially told what many British holidaymakers already know. In 
Mallorca it is now easier to get a plate of sauerkraut than a cup of tea. Some British tabloids 
reported this invasion of 'our' resorts as yet more evidence of German domination of 
Europe", reported The Guardian in May 1996. It seems that old stereotypes demonstrate an 
incredible ability to reinvent themselves continuously through time.69 
For Germany, the Unification of 1990 seemed to signal the end of the most painful 
consequence of defeat in 1945; that of its division. Many in the country declared that the 
Germans had by now paid for the responsibility of provoking the war, and that they should 
now be permitted to look to the future without having to be burdened with the past. Indeed, 
the policy of the Kohl government had already began to set the way in this respect. However, 
significant voices inside Germany warned of the dangers of the prospect of a united 
Germany, and were extensively reported back in Britain. Five years after Unification even 
The Observer interestingly recalled that Günter Grass had declared in 1990 "that Auschwitz 
had robbed Germans of the right to national normality".70 Writing in 1991 on the 
Historikerstreit - the heated debates on German history between German intellectuals which 
Jürgen Habermas himself described in 1996 as part of a process leading to the "intentional 
‘normalization’ of [the Germans’] historical and political understanding" - Mary Fulbrook 
adopted the same discourse on German normality.71 She asked whether the Germans should 
"construct a new sense of national pride", becoming a "normal nation" or whether they 
should never "normalize" their past and hence "relativize" it.72 Questioning the right of the 
Germans to perceive themselves as a normal nation, both the media and intellectuals in 
Britain seemed to reaffirm the postwar popular belief in the German abnormality. At the 
critical moment, few proved themselves ready to accept that Germany had changed and that 
it should be accepted into the international community as such. John Major’s invitation to 
Germany in 1994 to participate in the "Victory in Europe" celebrations in Britain the 
following year prompted many reactions as an attempt to forge history. "It’s is an example of 
how the coinage of history can be debased by politicians. It represents a kind of easy trading 
in reconciliation that doesn't so much insult the memory of those who died in the war as 
wander ignorantly past it", bitterly noted The Guardian.73  
Six years after Unification, the liberal Guardian, noted that Germany "burdened by 
its past and fearful of the future", was becoming "a nation of neurotics". It went on by 
reporting the views of a young German woman, Karin: "Karin does not want to be German. 
She insists on speaking English and admits with an unGerman directness that she would 
rather be an American or a Briton. France, too, is infinitely preferable to Germany. Karin is 
not exactly typical in wanting to deny her national identity. But nor is she exceptional".74 
After WWII British soldiers, the press, and the public compared the perverse qualities of 
Nazi Germany to that of a healthy and victorious Britain, thereby constructing British pride 
and self-confidence. Through its persistent post-Unification regurgitation of a seemingly self-
indulging discourse, the British press was not only unjust to the German people, but also 
damaged prospects of European understanding and co-operation. Moreover, it is revealing of 
 Evgenios Michail  
After The War and After The Wall: British Perceptions of Germany Following 1945 and 1989  
University of Sussex Journal of Contemporary History, 3 (2001) 
10
the anxiety emanating from certain elements of British public opinion at the end of the 20th 
century, and of the attendant attempt to reaffirm Britain’s qualities as a morally superior and 
victorious nation in comparison to the big European rival, Germany.  
Amongst those who did not share the same feelings for the German people, the 
negative representation of Germany was simply regarded as an expression of a deep socio-
political crisis inside Britain itself. Its decline as a world power, "the fragmentation of the 
British Isles" and the country’s uncertain position in the prospect of European integration, 
were facts that could be seen as reasons influencing many British to turn towards a 
sentimental discourse which was rooted in a glorious past.75 Writing for the Mass 
Observation archive, a forty-two year old Englishwoman explained the whole problem as a 
sign of a more general crisis of British national identity, due to the decline of Britain’s 
international status. As earlier symptoms of the same cause, she indicated the creation of the 
"useless Commonwealth", Britain’s "brokerage role between the United States and Europe 
and the "sabre rattling of the Falklands dispute".76 In the article "Angst on German unity 
reflects economic reality", The Guardian stated, even more pragmatically, that Britain had 
retreated to its anti-German rhetoric as a reaction to the prospect of a united Germany, 
dominating Europe and determining the pace of its economic and political development.77  
In the 1990s the British seemed to recreate the same kind of mentality as the one they 
had shared after the war when they saw their victory over the Nazis as a verification of their 
moral, cultural and socio-political superiority to the Germans.78 But half a century after the 
end of the war their contemporary reality did not offer any justification to similar claims. 
Britain at this point, despite the positive reactions to these changes from diverse elements of 
its society, gave the general impression that it held a negative stance, probably the most 
pejorative in Western Europe at least. The notion of German abnormality still seemed to be 
the dominant one amongst the British public, determining its perception of Germany and its 
people. However, the facts themselves – Unification and growth of Germany to the status of 
the main European power – actually reveal a nation that gradually but effectively seems to 
have surpassed the last obstacles that its alleged Sonderweg put in its way. At the end of the 
Twentieth Century, by refusing to accept the changing international realities and its role 
within, Britain ironically seems to have begun transforming itself into to the ‘European 
abnormality’.79 Europe-phobia, Germano-phobia and the projection of redundant stereotypes, 
all lead to the same question. Is Britain faced with its own Sonderweg? 
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